While plaintiff argued "that the jury was influenced by the evidence concerning failure to use the available lap belt in determining whether product was defective or whether a defect caused injuries," the court had to "assume that the jury was competent to follow and did follow the instructions given." Id. But we concluded that such error was harmless because the jury had determined that the defendant's product "was either not defective or that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing the accident," and thus the jury never reached the issue of seat belt use. non-use of the seat belts would be directly at odds with the Supreme Court's dictates barring evidence of a plaintiff's negligence in liability proceedings." Id. We held that it was error for the district court to allow such evidence because "the introduction of. The district court allowed defendant to introduce evidence that plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt but only for considering mitigation of damages. In Dillinger, plaintiff sued under strict liability for injuries he sustained while driving a vehicle manufactured by defendant. In this respect, the matter here is similar to that addressed in Dillinger v. Warren had sufficient knowledge to describe the throttle mechanism in general, the District Court properly precluded him from giving further opinions on the matter. Warren was unable to give reliable testimony on whether Yamaha improperly employed the squeeze finger throttle on its jet ski. With such a paucity of knowledge regarding the specifics of jet ski accelerating mechanisms, Dr. Warren acknowledged he could have conducted tests to evaluate the relative merits of alternative throttle designs but did not do so. Warren's asserted knowledge of possible alternatives to the accelerating mechanism came from his familiarity with outboard motors, which employ a twist grip mechanism, and from his recollection of a friend's motorcycle, which used a thumb throttle. Warren admitted he had never examined diagrams of the different throttles used on jet skis. Warren had never operated a jet ski and, by the time of trial, had only managed to ride a different model. At the time he wrote his expert report, Dr. Warren possessed expertise in relevant fields, he failed to apply this expertise to the matter at hand. at 743, meaning "the expert's testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of fact." Schneider, 320 F.3d at 405.Īlthough Dr. Third, the expert testimony must "fit," id. An assessment of "the reliability of scientific evidence under Rule 702 requires a determination as to its scientific validity." Id. In other words, "the expert's opinion must be based on the `methods and procedures of science' rather than on `subjective belief or unsupported speculation' the expert must have `good grounds' for his or her belief." Id. "We have interpreted this requirement liberally," holding that "a broad range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such." In re Paoli R.R. Qualification requires "that the witness possess specialized expertise." Id. First, the witness must be qualified to testify as an expert. 702, focusing on the "trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit." Schneider v. We have addressed the requirements of Fed.R.Evid.
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